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Introduction
Shifts towards later and lower fertility have occurred across developed countries. Crossnational comparisons have focused on demographic features of these shifts, meaning age, cohort, and parity (Chandola, Coleman and Hiorns 1999; Frejka and Calot 2001; Frejka and Sardon 2007) . This demographic focus has often led to the characterization of change within a given country as homogeneous. The study of socioeconomic correlates of fertility change has accordingly been limited largely to aggregate measures such as the overall female labor-force participation rates (Engelhardt and Prskawetz 2004) and the proportions of women going on to higher education or leaving the family home as young adults (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002) . Changes in withincountry socio-economic differentials in fertility have been given correspondingly little attention, and have largely been limited to contrasts between Anglo-American and continental European regimes (e.g., McLanahan 2004; Rendall et al 2005) . We address this gap in the present study of cross-cohort changes in timing of first births by education across three family-policy regime types that include 'conservative' Southern European regimes. We investigate whether changes in the timing of first births in Southern Europe match more closely the increasing socio-economic differentials of 'liberal' AngloAmerican regimes or the unchanged, and generally smaller, socio-economic differentials of countries with universalistic family-policy regimes of subsidized child-care and maternity leave.
In the remainder of the paper, we first describe theory and evidence on institutional influences on fertility, indicating where this points to potential sources of growth in, and mitigation of, socio-economic differentials in fertility. We next describe the unique combination of large-scale population data sources and methods for combining population and survey data in our study that allows for more precise estimation of educational differentials by age and parity across cohorts. We follow this with results and discussion.
Theory and Evidence on Institutional Influences on Fertility
Theoretical explanations for trends and cross-national differences in lower and later fertility have emphasized women's increasing employment opportunities and institutional environments for combining employment and motherhood (Morgan 2003; Adsera 2004 ).
The positive relationship between fertility and female labor force participation that has emerged since the mid-1980s (Ahn and Mira 2002) has added considerable impetus to this argument. Family policies that facilitate the combining of employment and motherhood roles through the provision of subsidized child-care and maternity leave compensation and rights to return to work after the leave are believed to be especially important for mitigating role incompatibility (Pampel 2001; Castles 2003) . While strong effects on employment continuity among mothers in countries with such family policies have been found (Ruhm 1998; Stier, Lewin-Epstein, and Braun 2001; Rønsen and Sundström 2002) , conclusions about the effects of family policy on fertility have been mixed (Gauthier 2005; McDonald 2006) . Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) , among others, have argued that this may be due to the relatively crude measurement possible with aggregate-level analyses, and not to a lack of any real effect. Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) also note, in discussing the limitations of aggregate measures, that family policies differentially influence the fertility of women with different labor-market opportunities. Milligan (2005) provides evidence of such differential effects of cash benefits for the Quebec province of Canada.
The strongest evidence of growth in socio-economic differentials in the timing of fertility between women with different labor-market opportunities has been seen in the U.S. and Britain. In both countries, age at first birth has continued to increase among college-educated women, while changing little among less educated women (Rindfuss, Morgan, and Offutt 1996; McLanahan 2004; Sullivan 2005; Kneale and Joshi 2008; Sigle-Rushton 2008) . Indications of similar trends across Anglo-American regimes, however, are also seen in the analyses of Chandola et al (2002) . Theoretical treatments of fertility timing make career-interruption costs the foundation of socio-economic differentials (Cigno and Ermisch 1989) , and indicate a potentially important role for public interventions in the price of child-care in mediating these differentials (Ermisch 1989 ). Gustaffson and colleagues (Gustaffson and Wetzels 2000; Gustaffson 2001 ) use cross-national differences in public interventions to explain why the fertility-timing patterns of Anglo-American countries contrast with those of the Nordic countries. They argue that while the market price of day-care differentiates women's ability to combine employment and motherhood in Anglo-American countries, the publicly-subsidized child-care and generous maternity-leave provisions of the Nordic countries mitigate such differentiation. A family-policy "regime" of publicly-subsidized child-care and maternity-leave provides strong incentives for women across socio-economic levels to first secure permanent employment before entering parenthood, and then to proceed quickly to childbearing with their jobs held for their return after each maternity leave.
Outside of the Nordic countries, France has long had a similar family-policy regime of subsidized child-care integrated with maternity leave. Gornick et al (1997) France to be at least as great among low-educated women as among women with higher education levels.
Cross-national studies of socio-economic differentials in fertility change, however, have been slow to emerge. Gustafsson et al (1996) (Bettio and Villa 1998; Billari 2004) , and lack of affordable housing (Bernadi 2005) . Perhaps in part because of the precipitous falls in fertility in these countries (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002) Recognizing the considerable challenges of achieving comparability between countries, a very simple analytical structure is adopted. Year of birth, age, and education are the only individual dimensions analyzed for each of the seven countries. A major innovation of the study is its joint use of population and survey data sources to achieve statistically precise and cross-nationally comparable estimates for the three countries, Italy, Spain, and the U.S., for which available population-level data on births and years of exposure include age, cohort, and parity, but not completed education. This allows us to include at least two countries from each of the three family-policy regime types.
A range of data sources is used for our analyses (see Appendix for details). probabilities. An illustration of this method as applied to first births by education in Italy is seen in Rendall et al (2008) .
In our data, there is differential censoring of fertility histories according to the woman's single-year birth cohort and the year of most recent observation in the population or survey data source. For each country, therefore, we first estimate annual first birth probabilities (hazards) by cohort, age, and educational attainment, and then use a first-birth life table (e.g., Chen and Morgan 1991) to transform these into cumulative proportions of women in the cohort and education category having a first birth by given ages. For the 1950s cohorts, these proportions extend to age 43, close to the end of the reproductive lifetime. For the 1960s cohorts, they extend to age 33. Given the calendaryear structure of most of our data, the French "generation" definition of age, defined as age attained in the calendar year, is used in place of the more usual "age at last birthday" definition. In general, age according to the "generation" definition will be about half a year younger than according to the "age at last birthday" definition. The comparisons of cohorts ten years apart in each country are important for both substantive and methodological reasons. Substantively, they allow us to explore the hypothesis that growth in socio-economic differentials in fertility will occur in less employment-supporting family-policy regimes as the importance of labor-market opportunities increase in women's lifetime trajectories. Methodologically, the crosscohort data provide a form of "difference in difference" analysis that controls for differences in education systems between the countries.
We restrict our analyses to native-born women, for both substantive and empirical reasons. Substantively, we are interested in comparing cohorts of women who, ten years apart, received that country's education and were exposed through their reproductive lives to that country's family policy and labor market institutions. Empirically, our methods of analysis involve combining person-years of exposure to first birth in surveys collected at different years with population data for those same years of exposure to produce cohort estimates. Implicitly, this combination of data assumes a closed population over the reproductive years, an assumption that will be reasonably approximated only for native-born women. This results in an imperfect match between survey and population data in Italy, Spain, and the U.S. Our comparisons of the firstbirth by age relationship estimated from the survey and population data demonstrated no significant mismatches in levels for our age and cohort combinations in the U.S. and Italy (see also Rendall et al, forthcoming, for Italy). First-birth probabilities are significantly higher in the survey than population, however, for Spain's 1960s cohort, a difference that may be due to biases from either source. Some overstatement of the shifts towards later childbearing across cohorts may therefore result. This has relatively little effect on the contrasts by education, however, as the population data scale and smooth the educationspecific patterns equally for the three education categories. In particular, our result of no decline in proportions of low-education women giving birth by age 20 holds whether or not the estimates are constrained to population-level age-specific first birth probabilities (results not shown).
Education presents the greatest challenges for developing comparable definitions between countries. Educational systems vary considerably between the seven countries.
Variability also is found between data sources in both when the individual is asked to report education and to what level of detail. In the countries where surveys are pooled, an additional element of complexity is provided by the pooling of surveys in which women's ages differ according to survey date. Our solution is to apply as closely as possible a common, three-category educational attainment classification based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED, see OECD 2003) . With the exception of Norway, described separately below, we code education as follows. "High" education level is coded for women who have completed any level of tertiary education (ISCED levels 4, 5, and 6). The tertiary level is defined to include both vocational and general education, including two-year, three-year, four-year and longer programs. The "medium" education level is assigned to women who have completed the highest secondary qualification (ISCED level 2 or 3). The "low" education level approximates those levels of education that fall short of the highest secondary-school level (ISCED level 1). From the Norwegian database available to us at the time of the data extraction, we coded education to include "lower" secondary school qualifications (ISCED level 2 in addition to level 1), and the "medium" education level includes "post-secondary, nontertiary" vocational qualifications at the ISCED level 4 (in addition to "upper secondary"
qualifications at ISCED level 3).
In general, the comparability of education across countries is compromised by variations especially in the length of time in tertiary education before a qualification is awarded (see Gustafsson and Kalwij 2006, ch.1) . No "lower-secondary" qualifications are awarded in the U.S., meaning that its "low education" group is more like that of Norway than the other countries. In the Southern European countries, time until the award of a university qualification is longer and many more students are enrolled than obtain a tertiary qualification. Our cross-cohort analytical framework is especially useful here for controlling for these contrasts in educational systems, as these system contrasts between countries are largely constant over time.
Methodological work on estimation of the relationship of education to fertility has shown that it matters greatly whether education is measured before or after fertility exposure, and whether schooling is still in progress (Kravdal 2004; see also Billari and Philipov 2005) . We handle this problem here by measuring education always at the most recently observed point in the data, interpreting this as a measure of lifetime completed education. In practical terms, this is the only common definition possible across the diverse data sources. It does, however, raise some issues of comparability between countries and between cohorts. In the survey data sources, education is observed at different ages depending on the year of the survey. In both the survey and population data sources, the age at observation is ten years younger for the 1960s cohorts than for the 1950s cohorts. In all cases, however, educational attainment is measured between ages 25 and 43, and therefore the problems of comparability between cohorts and data sources are unlikely to be severe. A second issue is the potential two-way causal relationships between education and fertility. This needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the results. The interpretation we give here is that the results indicate how educational attainment and associated employment trajectories of women are differentially compatible with family-formation according to the policy and institutional environment of that country.
Results
We first compare the distributions by education of women from the 1950s and 1960s cohorts of the seven countries (see Figure 1) . Recall that educational attainment is women. These similarities in education distributions between countries from different regime types and differences in distributions between countries within regime types are useful analytically, as they reduce the likelihood that differences in education-specific fertility between regime types are attributable largely to the nature of their education distributions.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
We begin our analyses of first births by education by presenting for the seven countries' 1960s cohorts their distributions of ages at first birth up to age 33, separately for each of the three education levels (see Figure 2a to 2g). The two Universalistic countries, France and Norway, are the most consistently distinct from both the AngloAmerican and Southern European countries for their younger ages at which higheducated women enter motherhood. In both France and Norway, the modal age of first birth is 27. This is only five to seven years older than for low-educated in these two countries (model ages 22 and 20 respectively) and only three years older than for medium-educated women (modal age 24 for both). The first-birth distributions of women from the three education groups in these two countries are, with the exception of the more peaked distribution for low-educated Norwegian women, similar in their shapes.
In contrast, in the Anglo-American and Southern European countries, greater variability in both shape and location of their first-birth distributions is seen between education categories. The distributions of ages at first birth for high-educated women tend to be flatter and are stretched towards lower peaks in women's late 20s to early 30s.
Their modal ages at first birth for high-educated women are also significantly later, at or around age 30. The youngest modal age among these five countries is the U.S., at age 28. This is, however, at a level that is significantly lower (around 0.06 as a proportion of all high-educated women in the cohort) than for France and Norway. Italy and Spain's higheducated women provide exceptions to the stretched shape of the distribution of ages at first birth. The very few first births that occur to high-educated women under age 25 will in part be responsible for the more peaked distribution around age 30 (just under 0.08 of the cohort), even when the first-birth hazards around age 30 are lower than those for years old). While in Spain the modal age difference is only five years, the humped shape of low-educated women's ages at first birth, extending from age 20, contrasts greatly with the more peaked shape about age 30 of Spain's high-educated women.
[
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A greater range of shapes and locations of first-birth distributions is seen across countries within a given regime type for medium-educated women. The patterns of first births by education in U.S. and Greece are remarkable for the very large gaps between the modal ages of medium-educated and high-educated first births: 20 versus 28 years old for the U.S. and 20 versus 28 to 30 years old for Greece. In Spain, the U.K., and Italy, medium-educated women have distributions of ages at first birth that are more similar to the distributions for high-educated than low-educated women. In Greece and the U.S., medium-educated women have distributions of ages at first birth that resemble more those of low-educated women. More detailed attention to differences in education systems and labor-market opportunities for women educated only to secondary-school level between the countries may be needed to uncover reasons for these patterns of greater similarity respectively to low-educated and high-educated women. A strong commonality across countries, however, is nevertheless that the proportions of mediumeducated women having first births in their early to mid-20s are substantially greater than for high-educated women.
We next compare the distributions of ages at first birth between the 1950s and 1960s cohorts. This allows us to evaluate differences in growth in educational differentials in first births between countries of different regime types. For this analysis, three age groups are formed: under 20, 21 to 25, and 26 to 33 years old (see Table 1 ). Remarkably for a period of rapid overall declines in fertility at young ages especially in Southern Europe (Frejka and Sardon 2007) We have concentrated the discussion so far on education-specific differentials in fertility. These will be only part of the explanation of why the overall distribution of ages at first birth may be more homogeneous in the Universalistic countries. Changes in the education distributions will also explain some of the change in the overall age distributions of first birth. Education-specific relationships, and changes to them across cohorts, will have a greater or lesser impact on the changes in the overall distribution of first births by age depending on the nature and magnitudes of changes in educational composition between cohorts. For example, where the proportions of low-educated women have declined substantially, persistently high early childbearing among this group will have a smaller effect on overall early childbearing. To separate out the effects of distributional change on the overall distribution of age at first birth from those of behavioral change, we compare the changes that would have resulted from behavioral change alone, counterfactually maintaining the educational distributions for the 1960s cohort at the 1950s cohorts' values (see the "all (1950s cohort education distribution)" rows of Table 1 Recall that Greece's proportion of women with low educational attainment halved, and its proportion with high educational attainment increased by more than 50 per cent across these cohorts. While in Greece these distributional changes had little net impact on the large (11 percentage-point) decline in first births at ages 21 to 25, they are sufficient to explain all of the 7 percentage-point decline in women having a first birth by age 20, and 5.5 percentage points of the 8 percentage-point increase in women having a birth between the ages of 26 and 33. In general, the effects of changes in education-specific fertility are seen to be larger than the effects of changes in the distribution of education between the 1950s and 1960s cohorts across the seven countries of our study.
Discussion
We used a combination of population and survey data sources to estimate changes in the timing of first births by education in seven countries representing three different familypolicy regime types. These estimates allowed us to explore further the "reproductive polarization" hypothesis that family policy mediates the growth of socio-economic differentials in fertility (Ekert-Jaffé et al 2002; Schulze and Tyrell 2002; Rendall et al 2009) . The evidence we find of educationally-homogeneous shifts in ages at first birth in the Universalistic countries of our study (France and Norway) and educationallyheterogeneous shifts in ages at first birth in both the Anglo-American countries (U.K. and U.S.) and the Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, and Spain) is consistent with this hypothesis. In particular, an increasingly strong mediating role of family policy for the socio-economic distribution of fertility timing is suggested by our findings. First, likelihood of early entry to motherhood was unchanged among low-educated women in both the Anglo-American and Southern European countries, while it decreased in the Universalistic countries. Second, a much greater proportion of high-educated women in the Universalistic countries than in the Anglo-American and Southern European countries continued to enter motherhood before their mid-30s.
The direction of the contrasts at early ages is surprisingly uniform between the Anglo-American and Southern European country groups. While previous studies have shown persistence of early childbearing at relatively high levels among low-educated women in Anglo-American countries, particularly the U.S., we are not aware of previous studies that have highlighted persistent early childbearing among women with low education in conservative countries. We have done so here for three Southern European countries, for which the main concern has been for late rather than early childbearing.
While this concern is clearly justified also by our findings, we give it an additional socioeconomic dimension. We find that only a quarter and a third respectively of high- that the universalistic regimes of publicly subsidized child-care integrated with maternity leave facilitate "on time" childbearing are instead supported by these comparisons.
While in the present study we have shown this for only the two countries of France and Norway, results in Andersson et al (2008) show moderate increases in median ages at birth across education groups in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden as well as in Norway.
Socioeconomic differentials in fertility have previously been emphasized in studies of patterns in the 'liberal' Anglo-American countries (McLanahan 2004; SigleRushton 2008) . Consistent with this, we find here that the U.S., with half its loweducation women giving birth by age 20, continues to exhibit the highest proportion of early childbearers among the low-education group. Greece, however, with two fifths of its low-education women giving birth by age 20, and very low prevalence of early childbearing among other education groups, exhibits at least as strong an educational differential in the timing of early fertility as in the U.S., and a stronger educational differential than that seen in the U.K. And while the proportion of low-education Spanish and Italian women giving birth at early ages was much lower than in the Anglo-American countries, the proportions were both persistent across cohorts (unlike in France and Norway) and involved substantial fractions of the cohorts due to the relatively low educational attainment in those two countries.
In Southern Europe and elsewhere among the conservative countries of continental Europe, later fertility has evoked concerns that lower completed fertility may result (Sobotka 2004) . Shifts to later fertility among higher-educated women in the U.S., 
Appendix: Data Sources and Estimation Methods

A. Population Register or Census data: Greece and Norway
Greece: 2001 Census data
The data on fertility and education and woman's country of birth used here come from . We correct for non-linkage for England and Wales using the national parity-specific fertility rates (Smallwood 2002) , and for France using a sample from the 1999 Census called the Family Survey. In each case, we assumed no linkage differentials by education, consistent with the findings of Babb and Hattersley (1992) and Robert-Bobée (2003) .
For both countries, we select into our samples for analysis only those women present across all the censuses covering their childbearing ages, and we smooth the first birth probabilities using a moving three-year weighted average that assigns a weight of 0.5 to the central age and 0.25 to each of the adjacent ages. Using the constrained estimation method of Rendall et al (2008) , we first pool personyears across the sample surveys in each of these three countries and then constrain to population age-specific first birth probabilities. We compare sample sizes and educational attainment between the 1995 and subsequent years' surveys in Table A1 .
C. Combined Surveys Constrained to Population
[ 
Population data
For Italy, Giorgi (1993) calculated first birth probabilities by single-year cohort. We use these probabilities, subsequently updated by Giorgi to 1997, as our population-level estimates of first-birth probabilities by single-year age.
For Spain, we observed numbers of first births by year of birth from 1980 onwards, the first year in Spain for which birth order is available. We used assumptions of constant distributions of births by parity to allocate parity to births before 1980 in the Spanish birth registration data. We followed a procedure based on reducing the eligible population of calendar-year birth cohorts by first births in earlier years to members of the cohort, and adjusting for mortality using life tables and adjusting for net migration using Census to Census change in the total cohort and assumptions about the parity distribution on net emigrants or net immigrants among the native born. This affects only the 1951-55 cohort, at younger ages. For both Spain and Italy, we checked our population estimates for conformity to those in the European Demographic Observatory database. For Spain this check was possible only for the 1961-65 cohort.
For the US, we use the set of age, year, and parity-specific first birth probabilities compiled by Schoen (2005) from the National Center for Health Statistics series. 
